Henry Is at It Again

The oldest surviving Cabinet member from any Administration, the 99-y.o. (!) Henry Kissinger continues to surprise with his ongoing analyses of foreign policy. Kissinger served formally in three Administrations (Kennedy, Nixon, Ford) and informally has consulted with nearly every other Administration from Eisenhower onward. One has to go back to Tallyrand to find a statesman with longevity like that despite changes in governments. He hasn’t entirely escaped the physical effects of time but his faculties are intact. He remains the smartest man in the room. His latest (last?) book released this July is Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy in which he profiles six pivotal leaders (Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle, Richard Nixon, Anwar Sadat, Lee Kuan Yew, and Margaret Thatcher) all of whom he knew personally. Each, despite flaws, had a major impact on national strategy and global order.

 
It would be negligent to fail to acknowledge that many folks (including more than a few journalists) regard Kissinger as the devil incarnate for his practice of realpolitik. (This always struck me as a strange word to intend as an insult. As opposed to what, fantasiepolitik?) His Westphalian approach (referring to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia) of leaving the internal affairs of other nations (who may not share our values) largely out of consideration in matters of diplomacy and geostrategy strikes them as callous (or worse) toward human rights. Kissinger’s point of view was that guaranteeing human rights around the world is outside the scope and power of the US government, and that nothing is more dangerous to them anyway than an unbalanced world order that leads to a wide war. Strategy therefore takes priority in diplomacy, such as the normalization of relations with China, done to counter the growing power (at the time) of the Soviet Union. Should he have forgone reopening relations as Nixon’s envoy with China because of the mounting casualties of the Cultural Revolution? It is possible for opponents to disagree on these points without either being fools or evil.
 
For 20^th century historians, the six bios in this book are a gold mine. To be sure, they are necessarily abbreviated: the book is 416 pages plus footnotes. Nonetheless within their lengths they are erudite, insightful, and informed by first-hand knowledge. They make clear that historical developments that in retrospect seem inevitable were really anything but. The resolution of key crises (whether in the Falklands, the Sinai, Algeria, or elsewhere) took leadership by leaders who went against conventional wisdom and political convenience: “they did not strive for, or expect, consensus.” All, accordingly, were divisive, as of course is Kissinger himself. I personally found the section on Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore 1959-90, the most interesting precisely because he did not represent a major power. He nevertheless navigated among the major powers while guiding the city state to astonishing prosperity as a global business and finance hub. Per capita income in Singapore in the 21^st century is always in the top 5 nations: sometimes #1 depending on exchange rates.
 
In his concluding chapter Kissinger laments the decline of “deep reading” amid the rise of visual culture, which enhances the biases of immediacy, intensity, polarity and conformity: “in an age dominated by television and the internet, thoughtful leaders must struggle against the tide.” He remains hopeful that some, though currently obscure, will arise to meet the challenges anyway. Providing fodder to both his supporters and antagonists, he quotes Machiavelli that in adversity “out of necessity the people turn to those who in tranquil times were almost forgotten.”
 
Thumbs up.

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