1959 Civil Defense Publication |
The news this week, like the news last week and the week
before, is full of the slaughter of ordinary people at work, markets, and play.
Sometimes the perpetrator is just a lone wacko and at other times he (it’s
usually a he) voices some ideological justification. If I have to choose, I
prefer the wackos. They openly enjoy killing for its own sake, which, while
unacceptable, at least has a certain purity to it. Far worse are those who claim
to be pursuing the greater good or to be avenging some wrong, whether real,
imagined, or open to interpretation. It is always ideologues and moralists who
commit mayhem on the largest scale, and who feel justified doing it.
It is well that the deadliest munitions are so hard to come
by. There is little doubt there are individuals and groups who would use NBC
(nuclear-biological-chemical) weapons if they could. Here and there they
already have, e.g. the anthrax attacks in the US in 2001 and the sarin gas attack
on the Tokyo subway in 1995. Fortunately, the N part of that triad remains the
domain of states, at least for now. Yet, no individual or group can commit
violence on the scale that a state can, and that brings us to the issue of Non-proliferation.
This, too, is in the news lately thanks to a controversial agreement currently
under debate. Whatever one’s opinion on it, underlying the debate is concern
about an older agreement.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
went into effect in 1970 and originally was set to expire in 1995. It is, in
essence, a bargain in which the signatory nuclear powers agree to share nonmilitary
nuclear technology with states that agree to forgo the development and acquisition
of nuclear weapons. It was reasonably successful during the next 25 years. The
fear in 1970 was that there would be some 30 mutually hostile nuclear armed states
by 1995 – a frightening scenario. In the event, only India, not a signatory to
the treaty, officially acquired nuclear weapons in that time period.
Unofficially, it is assumed two others, Israel and South Africa, developed nukes
secretly before 1995, though South Africa dismantled its nuclear arsenal in
1989. One might think the upcoming expiration would have been a major news
story in the early 1990s, but, as those old enough will recall, it wasn’t. Perhaps
this was just as well, for the NPT in 1995 was extended indefinitely without
any political brouhaha about it. In the US at least it was barely mentioned
outside of the most wonkish publications and PBS talk shows.
I do remember Henry Kissinger on one of those shows
discussing the matter with other guests (whose names I don’t remember) however.
He confused at least one of those guests by talking almost exclusively about the
global distribution of nuclear power reactors. When the person objected that
the issue was weaponry, not electric power, he responded, “That’s what we’re
really talking about, aren’t we?” and continued with what he was saying. This didn’t
appear to clear up anything for his co-panelist, but, of course, he was right.
There is no big design secret to a fission bomb. The basics
are widely known and plans have appeared on the internet. The obstacle to
building one is the production of fissile material, either Uranium-235 or
Plutonium-239; the former needs to be at least 90% pure and the latter more
than 93% pure to be weapons-grade. The path to U235 involves no esoteric technology.
The US succeeded in the 1940s, but it was a huge and massively expensive
industrial undertaking. It still is. Natural uranium is 99.28% U238, which is
not bomb material; this is why it is perfectly legal for a private individual
to own 15 pounds (7kg) of natural uranium. 0.71% of natural uranium is U235 and
the rest consists of other isotopes. (U233 would work in a bomb too, but it is
even rarer than 235.) U238 and U235 are so nearly identical that teasing out
the latter, even with large multiple centrifuges, is a long, tedious, and
repetitive process. This is the process presently used in Iran, supposedly for
reactor fuel; reactor-grade uranium needs to be enriched only to 3% U235. The
advantage to uranium over plutonium is that once you have enough weapons-grade
uranium, the bomb design and manufacture are simple. Smack two subcritical pieces
of U235 together quickly to create a single critical mass. That’s basically it.
The first uranium atomic bomb ever built used a gun to shoot one piece into the
other, and this design has been copied by others. Every single one has worked
on the first try.
Few countries are able or willing to invest the time,
resources, and fortune into refining weapons-grade uranium. There is, however,
a shortcut to nuclear weapons if you have a reactor. A portion of the U238 in the
fuel rods of reactors will convert to plutonium in the course of normal
operation. Though extracting Pu239 from the rods is neither easy nor safe, it
is well within the capability and financial resources of relatively modest
industrial powers. It is why protocols for the disposition of spent fuel are a
major component of the NPT, and it is why Kissinger was right. The drawback to
plutonium is that it is impossible to eliminate all Pu240 contamination from the
desired Pu239 end product. Pu240 is a highly unstable neutron emitter that
makes a simple gun design for a bomb infeasible; the two pieces would start to
interact at a distance before critical mass was achieved and the bomb would
fizzle. For this reason, an implosion is used instead; a Pu sphere of
subcritical mass is compressed to a critical density. The lenses and timing in
this sort of device need to be flawless or the sphere will just deform rather
than explode. Building a functioning weapon of this design is more of a challenge,
but meeting it is still quicker than refining uranium.
Fusion weapons, which use fission devices as triggers, are much
more complex than pure fission designs, of course. Nevertheless, each of the first
five nuclear states succeeded in building fusion devices less than a decade
after its first fission test. China took 32 months.
Since 1995, Pakistan and North Korea have tested and
deployed nuclear weapons, bringing the total number of acknowledged or presumed
nuclear armed states to 9. Besides these 9, there are 22 other countries that operate
nuclear power reactors. All of those 22 countries have the industrial potential
to extract plutonium from fuel rods. It is possible – even likely – that some
of them already have in place the facilities for doing so, if only as a precaution.
This is why a breakdown of the NPT could add a dozen or more nuclear weapons
states to the current list in perhaps as little as a year or two. The risk is
not negligible.
Unsurprisingly, it is not legal for private individuals to
own plutonium. Oddly, there is an exception. The isotope Pu238 is not practical
bomb material but it makes a marvelously long-lived power source for batteries.
The Voyager space probes, now entering interstellar space, rely on Pu238
batteries. So do some 20 remaining people (out of several hundred) who in the
1960s and 1970s received Pu238 powered pacemakers, which last a lifetime.
They’re allowed to keep them, though by law the plutonium from the pacemakers
must be sent to Los Alamos when the users die.
It’s a shame you can’t trust people with any isotope of
plutonium. Folks once dreamed of atom powered cars, planes, homes and, yes,
spaceships that never needed refueling. All of them are entirely possible as a
matter of engineering. It’s a nice dream. Regrettably, for human reasons rather
than technical ones, a nightmare is more credible.
The trouble about it now is that the wackos have access to the nuke weapons. Is there any solace in knowing if they use them, we use them? There's not for me. I guess the best hope, if there is one, is that their nuclear power reactors will have a malfunction similar to China. But even then at what cost to our overall environment?
ReplyDeleteDeterrence actually worked during the Cold War, as evidenced by our being here. I think it still does as far as the major powers are concerned: a use of a nuclear weapon against any of the first five nuclear countries would mean total annihilation for the country that did it – or for the country that facilitated it. In Cold War parlance, there is no reliable first strike capability against any of those five, which means an unacceptably large counterstrike capability always will survive. That always has been and should remain enough to deter any straightforward attack. The bigger risk, as membership in the nuclear club grows, is the possible escalation of some regional dispute where one side miscalculates the capability and response of the other; bad enough in itself, this could spread in the same way that a relatively minor spat in the Balkans blew up into WW1. A lesser but still real risk is that inadequately secure fissionables could get into nongovermental hands. There was a false alarm about South Africa’s materials not long ago.
DeleteThe clip from "Back to the Future" actually crossed my mind as I read this blog. :) Thanks for adding it.
ReplyDeleteI didn't know about the ability to use the devolving materials to create weapons grade material. That is a scary thought. And honestly, a dirty bomb can be just as frightening as a full blown atomic strike. A little radiation can go a long way.
Radiation was a popular health therapy in the 1920s. There were radium baths, radium pills, and (I kid you not) radium suppositories. All in all I'd rather not find out if the promoters were right. http://s138.photobucket.com/user/ParshallAE/media/ad-radiumrestoreshealth.jpg.html
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